Restraint, Diplomacy, and Restoring Arctic Exceptionalism

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Left to Right – Cynthia Lazaroff (Board Member of the Arctic Institute), Pavel Devyatkin (Senior Associate at The Arctic Institute), Anatol Lieven (Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute), Jennifer Spence (Director of the Arctic Initiative at the Belfer Center), and Edward Alexander (Senior Arctic lead of the Woodwell Climate Research Center) speak during the panel discussion on Restoring Arctic Exceptionalism. Photo: Khody Akhavi, Quincy Institute

What makes the Arctic an exceptional region for international cooperation and diplomacy? Could the Far North be a key part of US-Russia rapprochement? What is the role of the Arctic in climate change and human action to limit it? How can Indigenous know-how contribute to knowledge on Arctic ecosystem change, climate interventions, and the interconnectedness of Arctic actors?

The “Restoring Arctic Exceptionalism” workshop and conference in Washington, D.C., on June 11-12 2025, sought to answer these questions and more. Jointly organized by the Arctic Institute and Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, the discussion involved experts, diplomats, Indigenous leaders, officials, and scientists from Arctic nations such as Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the United States, and non-Arctic states such as Austria, China, and Turkey.

Central to the conference was President Trump’s ongoing fixation on acquiring Greenland and its snowballing effect on rethinking both US foreign engagement and Arctic cooperation at large. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Norwegian Ambassador Anniken Huitfeldt, Danish Ambassador Jesper Møller Sørensen, and Greenlandic Head of Representation in the USA Jacob S. Isbosethsen devoted much of their remarks to the discourse on Greenland, stressing that Nordic cooperation remains strong. Senator Murkowski said she does not “think the Trump administration would like to buy Greenland once they realize what the price of Greenland would be.”

Following the remarks by the Senator and Arctic diplomats, an expert panel on “Arctic Exceptionalism and Climate Crisis” was convened featuring Edward Alexander, senior Arctic lead of the Woodwell Climate Research Center, Pavel Devyatkin, Senior Associate & Leadership Group member at The Arctic Institute, Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia program at the Quincy Institute, and Jennifer Spence, Director of the Arctic Initiative, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Cynthia Lazaroff, Founder of Women Transforming Our Nuclear Legacy, moderated the conversation.

The experts discussed how the narrative of Arctic exceptionalism should be restored to address the climate crisis, to emphasize human security over military security, to prioritize Indigenous Peoples’ leadership, to advance peace, and to avoid war. Panelists started by discussing how the region’s exceptionalism is most often associated with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 speech in the northern Russian city of Murmansk, where he called for an Arctic “zone of peace,” circumpolar cooperation, demilitarization, and convening “a joint Arctic Research Council” which went on to inspire the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996.

Climate change is central to Arctic exceptionalism: the Arctic is crucially important because it is warming more than three times as fast as the planetary average, and because most of the potentially disastrous climatic “tipping points” and feedback loops are in this region: the melting of the Greenland ice cap; the reduction in the reflection of sunlight back into space; and the mass release of methane from the melting Arctic permafrost. From the point of view of climate change, the exceptional nature of the Arctic is therefore not a political or diplomatic idea but a physical fact.

The Arctic is also exceptional for its long history of scientific research and collaboration. The region’s ecosystems, including the boreal forests, are unique and play a critical role in the world’s climate. The Arctic’s ecosystem has provided these exceptional services to us as humans, and we must resolve to maintain exceptional cooperation to continue protecting the biosphere. The question facing policymakers and experts today is whether we still believe in that positive and pragmatic vision or whether we will allow cynicism and confrontation to define the Arctic’s future.

Risks and Opportunities for America from a Melting Arctic

The workshop began with a roundtable discussion focused on current and future priorities for US Arctic policy. The speakers noted the specificities of the Trump administration’s position on climate change and multilateral arrangements such as the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, climatological changes cannot be ignored by American security calculations in the region or globally. A warmer Arctic is a more uncertain Arctic, not a “new normal.” Therefore, if Washington does not apply a climate perspective to Arctic security issues, the result will be an incomplete picture of the real situation. In the end, a rapidly warming climate does not produce winners and losers, only losers.

US priorities in the Arctic should include ocean governance and implementation of the various institutional arrangements affecting the Arctic Ocean, such as the Polar Code, Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, and marine conservation. Preserving such cooperative arrangements is crucial in the current context of increased instability and limited cooperation at the Arctic Council.

The work of the Arctic Council, previously fairly harmonious, has faced increased difficulties in recent years. Thus, the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial meeting lacked a joint declaration due to then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s disagreement with using the term “climate change.” Much more seriously, in 2022 the seven Western Arctic states suspended Council meetings in response to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine – though without the participation of the largest Arctic state, the usefulness of the Arctic Council as an institution is questionable.

Several speakers therefore recommended that North American and European policymakers should develop innovative forms of bolstering Arctic cooperation by resuming in-person meetings with Russian officials and experts and ensuring the Permanent Participants (especially Indigenous leadership) and Observer States play a greater role in Arctic Council decision-making, such as the temporary pause in 2022.

US-Russia-China Cooperation and Security in the Arctic

Russia is the largest Arctic state and has had a major presence in the Arctic for many centuries. In recent years, Russia’s diplomatic isolation has been a significant limiting factor in Arctic cooperation. The Trump administration has, however, attempted a different approach to relations with Moscow, due to strategic factors, including, most notably, great power competition with China. America’s ability to deal with the China challenge is reduced if Moscow and Beijing are actively cooperating against the US, especially in security matters. Therefore, the US has a strong interest in disincentivizing Russia from engaging in that kind of cooperation with China.

However, since the end of the Cold War, each US administration has sought rapprochement with Russia that ultimately failed. Those resets were attempted to be built from the bottom up, on the issues where the US and Russia thought they had common interests. Unless Washington and Moscow address the fundamental differences over broader security disputes across Europe, efforts at cooperation in the Arctic and elsewhere will likely amount to naught.

Speakers focusing on Russia noted that Arctic exceptionalism, if understood as a state of political reality, is not dead. Rather, it is only partially frozen, diminished in visibility but still present beneath the surface. Indigenous communities have been among the most negatively affected by the rupture in US-Russia (and broader Arctic) cooperation. Neither Moscow nor Washington wants to militarize the Arctic further, especially in ways that undermine arms control agreements. Moreover, if we want to incentivize peace in Ukraine, the Arctic may be the strategic lever. Meanwhile, practical, incremental agreements with Russia (until the end of the Ukraine War) focused on safety, science, and emergency response are suitable. India’s presence in the Arctic, especially through its engagement with Russia, might offer a potential trilateral pathway for US-Russia cooperation. Looking to the future, the Fifth International Polar Year (2032-2033) is an opportunity for meaningful dialogue and cooperation.

China’s presence in the Arctic has developed over the past couple of decades, due to a combination of the melting of the Arctic sea ice and China’s vastly increased economic reach. There are opportunities for selective cooperation, taking into account a Chinese interpretation of Arctic exceptionalism, in areas such as fisheries and climate research. China supports the notion of Arctic exceptionalism to insulate Arctic cooperation from broader geopolitical tensions. It was also noted as worthwhile to explore China-Nordic partnerships to ease Russia-Nordic tensions. Across the board, new forms of diplomacy, including track 1.5 and 2 efforts, will help mitigate misunderstandings and support dialogue.

Cooperation with the Arctic Council and Indigenous Peoples

The expert panel, focused on the Arctic Council, Nordic states, and Indigenous Peoples, emphasized that Arctic exceptionalism should include elements such as science diplomacy, environmental protection, and Indigenous leadership. Cooperation requires interconnected relationships between the multiple layers of actors: nation-states, Indigenous Peoples, scientific communities, civil society, and international institutions.

Indigenous Peoples expressed that environmental concerns most deeply resonate in their communities. “Traditional” security issues that concern nation-states are secondary. Despite the state-led pause and resumption of limited collaboration at the Arctic Council, Indigenous Peoples’ organizations have continued to meet in-person over the last two years. Indeed, Indigenous peoples have a long history of upholding Arctic cooperation when states were absent. Speakers emphasized how Arctic Indigenous Peoples met in 1973 at the first Arctic Peoples conference – over two decades before the 1996 establishment of the Arctic Council. Speakers underlined the co-production of knowledge as a crucial track for Arctic cooperation. This entails combining Indigenous knowledge (which view the whole as greater than the sum of its parts and suggest trans-rationalism) with Western forms of natural science.

We have entered a period of uncertainty for Arctic cooperation. In that context, it is of utmost importance to understand both the drivers of uncertainty as well as the levers to deal with such uncertainty. As a result, it is valuable to think about what we mean by “Arctic exceptionalism” and how it drives the norms of Arctic cooperation. Doing so allows us to simultaneously build a constructive narrative and deal with issues such as expanding the democratic base of Arctic governance. Beyond the Arctic Council, speakers remarked that other institutions and actors also have the potential to drive cooperation between states and political organizations. For instance, the European Union was described as having the normative ability to shape the present and future of Arctic governance by driving climate norms through the EU Green Deal and subsequent policies.

Climate Interventions and Geoengineering

The workshop ended with a discussion of geoengineering in the Arctic as an important proposal, as efforts to curtail emissions are largely failing. The higher the temperature rises, the greater the strength of the feedback loop is, endangering human civilization. The Arctic is the only region where geoengineering is a serious prospect because it is in the greatest danger from the impacts of climate change. This is the single greatest reason why we must restore cooperation and reignite the narrative of Arctic exceptionalism. Geoengineering is a risky approach that should only be adopted if attempts adequately to limit emissions continue to fail. If individual countries introduce separate and competitive programs, the dangers will be hugely increased. International cooperation in research and, if necessary, development by the Western Arctic countries must therefore be carried out in cooperation with Russia and China.

Serious engagement with any form of testing and deployment thus requires more integrated system thinking as well as more eco-responsible policies and practices aligned with planetary boundaries. As in other regional contexts, experts fear that the deployment of geoengineering technologies and infrastructure in the Arctic may lead to unbalanced discussions that forego adaptation and mitigation technologies. However, while in the past, the discussion of geoengineering was frowned upon, it is now incumbent on the Arctic scholarly community to consider the prospects and concerns of potential climate interventions.

Pavel Devyatkin is a Senior Associate & Leadership Group Member at The Arctic Institute. Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Romain Chuffart is the President & Managing Director of The Arctic Institute. Artin DerSimonian is Junior Research Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.